

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

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15 March 1966  
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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 15 March 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. G. O. IJEWERE

(Nigeria)

OF MICHIGAN

MAY 26 1966

DOCUMENT  
COLLECTION

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO  
Mr. G. de CARVALHO SILOS  
Mr. D. SILVEIRA da MOTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV  
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV  
Mr. D. POPOV  
Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS  
Mr. S. F. RAE  
Mr. C. J. MARSHALL  
Mr. P. D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK  
Mr. V. VAJNAR  
Mr. R. KLEIN

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ABERRA  
Mr. A. ZELLEKE

India:

Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI  
Mr. K. P. LUKOSE  
Mr. K. P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI  
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO  
Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. G. O. IJEWERE  
Mr. O. O. ADESOLA

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU  
Mr. N. ECOBESCU  
Mr. C. UNGUREANU  
Mr. A. COROLIANU

Sweden:

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD  
Mr. I. VIRGIN  
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. O. A. GRINEVSKY  
Mr. S. A. BOGOMOLOV  
Mr. G. K. EFIMOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. OSMAN  
Mr. M. KASSEM

United Kingdom:

Sir Harold BEELEY  
Miss E. J. M. RICHARDSON  
Mr. M. R. MORLAND

United States of America:

Mr. A. S. FISHER  
Mr. C. H. TIMBERLAKE  
Mr. L. D. WEILER  
Mr. D. S. MACDONALD

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): I declare open the two hundred and forty-eighth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): As we resume our discussions of how we may find an opening to progress in our efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament, I should like to recall that paragraph 7 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, under which we are operating, provides that --

"Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means." (ENDC/5, para.7)

I should like to make a few brief observations on some meetings that have been taking place in Geneva during the past few days and have also been dedicated to this end. I am referring to the meetings of the World Peace Through Law Centre. In these efforts to build a structure of law for world peace we have a task which is parallel to the one in which we are engaged at this Conference. Just as we seek to halt the arms race and develop a programme for general disarmament, the efforts of these men and women are devoted to the need to improve and develop the peace-keeping facilities of international society -- a need which is recognized, though in different ways, in both the USSR draft (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1) and the United States draft (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1, 2, 3) of general disarmament programmes.

It should be encouraging to our efforts here that the above-mentioned efforts have grown. They are not only developing the potentialities of the application of these wise minds to the problem of securing peace, but also enlarging the understanding among the peoples of the world of the role of law and peaceful settlement. The delegation of the United States extends its warm wishes for the success of these efforts, which are devoted to the quest for peace for men and nations through justice and under law. We also wish to congratulate the participants on the creation of the World Association of Judges as an autonomous body within the Centre.

I should also like to say how highly honoured the delegation of the United States is to have with us today the distinguished Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Mr. Warren, who has just been named President of the World Association of Judges. It is obviously not necessary for me to point out the way in which Chief Justice Warren has affected human events and changed the pattern of men for the better.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

It has been some time since we last discussed general and complete disarmament. I agree with the representative of the United Kingdom (ENDC/PV.237, p.12) that this gap in our consideration of this important subject is regrettable.

When we last discussed this subject, we devoted considerable time to the measures of the first stage of a treaty on general and complete disarmament -- the portions of that stage which dealt with nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, conventional armaments and nuclear disarmament. We also dealt with appropriate measures of control. Unfortunately, we failed to make much progress because of differences over the manner of achieving disarmament, particularly with respect to the problems of balance and control.

These differences have led the Conference to focus greater attention on collateral measures. The United States has felt, and I think there is increasing agreement here, that this concentration on collateral measures offers the most practical opportunities for progress. The United States has set forth a number of collateral proposals -- I think a preferable term would be "first steps" -- which would lead to general and complete disarmament by a series of concrete actions and agreements. We believe that each would be in the interests of all concerned, and each would lead us nearer to our final goal. Nevertheless, we must never lose sight of the fact that our ultimate goal is general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Our meeting today is for the purpose of considering how we can best reach that goal.

To establish the proper setting for the discussion of the subject of general and complete disarmament, I should like to refer again to the Joint Statement of Principles agreed to by the United States and the Soviet Union in September 1961 as the basis for future multilateral negotiations on disarmament. It has been before our Conference for quite some time as document ENDC/5. Paragraph 4 of that Joint Statement reads:

"The disarmament programme should be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages until it is completed, with each measure and stage carried out within specified time-limits."

Paragraph 5 states:

"All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all".

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Paragraph 6 states:

"All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations."

The United States Treaty Outline follows these principles. It starts from the premise that all production of existing major armaments, except small agreed replacement allowances, and all production of new types of armaments should cease immediately. It then calls for the balanced reduction of armaments, by stages and under such verification arrangements as are necessary to ensure that remaining agreed levels of armaments are not exceeded.

Our Soviet colleague has called attention to the principle of balanced disarmament and implied that the West wishes to substitute reduction of armaments for disarmament. He goes on to argue that the Western Powers are interested only in maintaining the balance of armaments. I should like to make two points on this line of reasoning. First, although reduction of armaments may not comprise the whole of disarmament, certainly the only way we can arrive at a state of disarmament is by a process of reduction. Secondly, I know of no way of accomplishing disarmament in accordance with the principles I have just quoted -- so that no State gains a military advantage at any stage of that process -- except by making reductions in such a manner that whatever balance exists at the beginning of the process is maintained throughout. If the rough balance which now exists has so far maintained peace among the major Powers, we see no reason to upset that balance. It is for this reason that we seek balanced disarmament and oppose measures which would upset the existing armaments balance in favour of the Soviet Union.

As we see it, the USSR in its proposal seeks not balanced progression towards general and complete disarmament but a drastic modification, in the first stage, of the current balance. It does so in spite of having affirmed the principle of balanced, phased disarmament in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles. It does so in spite of all its words here at this Conference and in its draft treaty on general and complete disarmament.

The Soviet draft treaty proposes in its article 5 that nuclear delivery vehicles be reduced in the first stage to a strictly limited, though unspecified, level of

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land-based missiles, and that all further production of nuclear delivery vehicles be halted.

Whatever level of missiles the Soviet Union might have in mind for the end of the first stage, its proposal is indeed a strange interpretation of the balanced disarmament by stages called for by the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles. I can only interpret this plan as an effort, not to achieve balanced disarmament, but rather to juggle the disarmament process so as to achieve an advantage.

In addition to this demonstrated lack of balance, the Soviet plan violates another principle by not providing for the inspection necessary to verify that there are no undeclared or clandestine armaments in excess of the levels agreed upon.

In spite of these rather obvious objections to the Soviet plan for the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles, the United States sought details in clarification of the Soviet proposal during our discussions here in 1964 on item 5b, nuclear delivery vehicles, of the agenda (ENDC/52) for consideration of the first stage of general and complete disarmament. We agreed to explore specific questions with the Soviet Union in an appropriate working group, provided that all relevant proposals were considered, as envisaged in the agreed agenda item, rather than merely that of the Soviet Union. Our efforts to find possible ways to overcome the impasse foundered, however, on the Soviet delegation's insistence that we accept its concept as the pre-condition for establishing a working group.

As we return today to consideration of general and complete disarmament, we might bear in mind another key provision of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles: that "States ... should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date." (ENDC/5, para.8)

We should note in this connexion that there is one provision which appears in both the United States and the Soviet draft treaties and which relates to strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, to which we probably did not give enough attention in 1964 in the context of general and complete disarmament. I am referring to the provision in both draft treaties for limitation of further production of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

In view of the difficulties which I have summarized and which so far have separated us on the subject of reduction of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles,

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I think it appropriate that we should now address ourselves to the subject of halting production. In fact, we feel that this is really the proper place to start the disarmament process as it applies to strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. As the representative of Bruma once remarked during our discussions here: "The more we pile up these terrible weapons the more difficult it will become to reach an agreement to destroy them." (ENDC/PV.178, p.34) We agree with that wise statement; we think that we should stop piling up these weapons and should then start destroying those we have already piled up.

Members of the Committee will recall that the United States presented a proposal in 1964, agreement on which would have prevented the further accumulation of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and would have accomplished one of the major parts of the stage I tasks in general and complete disarmament. The United States proposal (ENDC/120) to freeze the number and characteristics of strategic offensive and defensive delivery vehicles has already been described (ENDC/PV.162, pp.16 et seq.; ENDC/PV.184, pp.13 et seq.), but perhaps it would be useful to review it briefly here.

Our freeze proposal is designed to halt further increases in strategic armaments while we continue our efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament. It includes armaments in groupings which closely parallel the strategic armaments of both the USSR and the United States. All weapon systems in the strategic forces of both sides are included. This proposal would apply to strategic missiles and aircraft, within specified limits of range or weight, and would include anti-ballistic missiles and sea-based missiles.

The production of all affected armaments and specified sub-assemblies for such armaments would be halted except for production required to cover natural attrition losses due to accident, and, in the case of missiles, agreed annual quotas of confidence and training firings. Production of replacements would be on a one-for-one basis only, and of the same type of armament.

The verification arrangements for the freeze would concentrate on monitoring critical production steps and replacements. It would also involve monitoring space launchings. Space launchings would of course be permitted under the freeze, but would be monitored for the purpose of ensuring that they were in fact space launchings. Existing levels of armaments would not be subject to verification under



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the freeze. Illustrative material on verification of the freeze was given to the Committee by Ambassador Timberlake on 27 August 1964. As he stated at that time, the inspection arrangement described --

"... would be much less intrusive than that required for general and complete disarmament and yet sufficient to afford the necessary level of assurance of compliance ..." (ENDC/PV.211, p.11)

I think the close relationship of that proposal to the stage I provisions of the United States outline treaty for general and complete disarmament is clear. We believed in 1964, and we believe today, that agreement on this logical first step in the control of the growth of inventories of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles could lead to the subsequent reduction of such weapons and then to further progress towards general and complete disarmament.

The Soviet representative has objected that the United States freeze proposal provides for control without disarmament. In evaluating that objection I should like to indicate again specifically what a freeze of the type we are now proposing, and which we proposed earlier, would accomplish.

In presenting the details of our freeze proposal to the Conference in April 1964, I noted (ENDC/PV.184, p.14) that the United States operational inventory of strategic missiles during that year would reach some 550 per cent of the level which existed at the time this Conference began in 1962, and that by 1965 it would have grown to an aggregate increase of 750 per cent over the 1962 level. At the time I was speaking, the United States strategic retaliatory forces actually contained over 750 operational long-range ballistic missiles. Today they contain over 1,300 -- an almost two-fold increase since the United States proposed that we stop the further production of such armaments. In other words, prompt adoption of the freeze proposal in 1964 would have had approximately the same result, as far as United States current inventories of nuclear delivery vehicles in this category are concerned, as a reduction of something like 50 per cent would have today.

In this connexion I might note that the statements made by Soviet military leaders last month, on the occasion of the anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy, indicate that these leaders believe that the Soviet Union is fully abreast

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of the United States in missiles armaments. I am sure, therefore, that the inventory of such missiles in the Soviet Union has also greatly increased during this period, and that a freeze would have had the same effect upon it.

As I remarked at the time I explained our freeze proposal to this Committee, there is little to be gained by indulging in reflections on what might have been; nevertheless I think that the significance of a freeze for the goals of disarmament is made quite clear by these facts. A more descriptive term for what would have resulted from the freeze, a term which describes what we should perhaps pursue with more diligence, is "non-armament". The less extensively nations arm, the less intensive need be the concern for disarmament.

In addition to the "non-armament" effect of the freeze, I might note in passing another proposal made by the United States in 1964, for actual reduction of armaments -- a proposal which, to my regret, our Soviet colleague referred to with scorn last week (ENDC/PV.246, p.29). I am referring to the B-47/Tu-16 bomber bonfire proposal (ENDC/PV.176, pp.5 et seq.). If that proposal, as well as the freeze proposal, had been agreed to, the number of strategic delivery vehicles of all types, instead of being substantially larger than in 1964 -- as is now the case -- would be considerably smaller.

Although my Soviet colleague belittled the bonfire proposal as a United States effort to dispose of some obsolescent bombers under the guise of a disarmament measure, he failed to note that most of the United States B-47 bombers, although no longer operational, are still a part of the United States mobilization reserve from which they could be promptly reactivated for service. His argument also ignores the cold fact that, although such bombers as the B-47 and the Tu-16 may be considered as obsolescent by the major Powers, they might well be sought by some would-be nuclear weapon State as a delivery vehicle. We still think it would be a significant disarmament measure, particularly in connexion with a freeze on further production, if hundreds of these bombers on both sides, whatever their current status, were destroyed as proposed by the United States.

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I wish to make one final point. In response to the Soviet Union's criticism that the freeze does not provide for disarmament, the United States has sought to learn what sort of reductions the Soviet Union would seek in connexion with a freeze. Last September, at the United Nations General Assembly, the United States representative reiterated our interest in halting the further production of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and indicated that if progress could be made in the exploration of that measure we should also be willing to explore the possibility of significant reductions (A/PV.1334, p.37). To date the Soviet Union has not responded to that statement.

The United States thinks that it is now time to get on with the business. We think a most important item on our order of business here is halting the growth of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Whether we reach agreement to do so in the process of discussing general and complete disarmament, or whether we reach agreement to do so as a collateral measure, is not so important to us as that such an agreement should be negotiated and implemented soon.

In conclusion, although I must admit that progress toward general and complete disarmament has been disappointingly slow and that there seems no immediate hope for a sudden break-through, I think we should take some encouragement from the progress that has been made to date on matters which are covered by both the Soviet and the United States drafts dealing with general and complete disarmament. The communications link between heads of Governments, a link envisaged by both the Soviet and the United States draft treaties, is now a fact (ENDC/67); the nuclear test ban called for by both draft treaties has now been partially realized in the limited test-ban agreement (ENDC/100/Rev.1); the ban on weapons of mass destruction in outer space, a ban which was called for by both treaty drafts, has been expressed in United Nations General Assembly resolution 1884 (XVIII). And I think we should take further encouragement from the opportunities that are now before us for further advances toward our goal -- that is, reaching agreement on items which are covered in both draft treaties for general and complete disarmament.

For example, the measure which I discussed last week (ENDC/PV.246, pp.35 et seq.), for halting the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons and the transfer of large amounts of such material to peaceful purposes, would certainly curtail the growth of nuclear weapon arsenals. It would not only be a most significant measure in itself, but would accomplish the task set by stage I, section C,

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paragraphs 1 and 2 of the United States draft treaty outline for general and complete disarmament. In fact, it would do more, since the United States cut-off proposal envisages the destruction of large numbers of existing nuclear weapons in order to obtain the materials intended for transfer to peaceful purposes.

We also have the opportunity to prevent further growth in the inventories of carriers of nuclear weapons and to prepare the way for the reduction of such armaments. Our proposal to freeze the numbers and characteristics of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles is designed to accomplish that objective. As President Johnson reaffirmed in his message to the opening meeting of this session of our Conference, if progress can be made in the exploration of this measure:

"... the United States will be prepared to explore the possibility of significant reductions in the number of these delivery vehicles.

To facilitate agreement, let us begin now to seek common understanding of some of the issues involved in both these proposals." (ENDC/165, p.3)

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Today we are resuming the discussion on general and complete disarmament. The General Assembly, by its resolution 2031 (XX) ---

"Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to continue its efforts towards making substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control ... and to report to the General Assembly, as appropriate, on the progress achieved." (ENDC/161)

Our task seems clear. The Soviet delegation notes with satisfaction that all the representatives of the socialist countries and non-aligned States participating in the general discussion have emphasized the particular importance and urgency of the problem of disarmament. It is clear that the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international supervision is the main task before the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

Today all peace-loving humanity insistently demands a rapid solution of the main problems of general and complete disarmament and of nuclear disarmament, in particular. The rapid conclusion of an agreement on disarmament has become a vital need of our time. The extension of the scientific and technical revolution to the military

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sphere and the resulting intensification of the nuclear arms race has placed the world in a very unstable and dangerous situation, which is sometimes picturesquely described as the "balance of terror".

A colossal danger to the cause of peace is undeniably latent in the enormous stockpiles of nuclear weapons already accumulated in various parts of the world, which according to some calculations have a power more than a hundred thousand times greater than that of all the explosives used during the whole of the Second World War. This danger, however, is still further increased by the systematic provocative flights over foreign territory by United States bombers carrying nuclear bombs, with the many attendant risks of war breaking out by accident. The policy and practice of the United States are obviously tending in a direction diametrically opposed to the strengthening of the factors making for peace, and are increasing the probability of the outbreak of nuclear war.

There is only one method of eliminating this danger: an agreement on nuclear disarmament, which is the crux of the problem of general and complete disarmament. Unfortunately, after four years of discussion the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has not had any success in solving the basic problems of general and complete disarmament. It is legitimate to ask what is hindering our efforts to prevent absolute stagnation in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament. Is it only a formal difference in the texts of the disarmament plans submitted by the sides, or has the deadlock in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament been caused by other differences, deep and fundamental, in the policy of the sides?

It is clear that in order to answer these questions we must not only consult the documents submitted by the various delegations to our Committee, but we must also look into the policies actually pursued by some States members of the Committee during all the twenty post-war years of negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

More than twenty years ago, on 24 January 1946, the General Assembly of the United Nations unanimously adopted a resolution (A/12, A/PV.17) declaring that the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission set up by the resolution should draft proposals on measures to ensure that atomic energy was used only for peaceful aims and that atomic weapons were eliminated from national arsenals.

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In his major speech as United States representative, Bernard Baruch made the following declaration twenty years ago:

"Let this be anchored in our minds: peace is never long preserved by weight of metal or by an armament race." (AEC/PV.1, p.45)

"... We must remember that the peoples do not belong to the governments but that the governments belong to the peoples.

We must answer their demands; we must answer the world's longing for peace and security." (ibid., p.31)

As you see, it cannot be denied that the United States representatives of that period were aware that the peoples saw their security in the cessation of the arms race and in disarmament; nor can it be denied that those representatives were aware of their responsibility to the peoples. All this, however, was no more than comic back-chat in a pantomime; in fact the United States adopted after the war a policy which unleashed a nuclear arms race. The United States leaders showed that they had decided to keep a tight hold on nuclear weapons as a means of implementing their "position of strength" policy, and that they regarded the arms race as an instrument for carrying out their predatory political plans.

This has been shown in practice. After all these pompous declarations by the United States representative, ten years went by. Through the fault of the United States the problem of disarmament remained unsolved. To judge from the results of the arms race during the ensuing period, humanity was further from a practical solution to the problem of disarmament in 1956 than it had been ten years before in 1946, when the General Assembly adopted resolutions on the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes, the elimination of atomic weapons from national armaments, and the rapid general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. This is eloquently attested by, for example, the following facts.

After the Second World War, armies were demobilized everywhere. This also occurred in the United States, whose armed forces were reduced to 1,348,000

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men and whose military expenditure was reduced to \$16,600 million. In 1955, however, the United States armed forces had risen to 2,728,000 men -- an increase of nearly 1,500,000 -- and the United States military budget had risen to \$40,050 million -- by nearly three times -- during this decade.

As for nuclear disarmament, the United States would not hear of it. Mr. Lodge, who was then the United States representative at the United Nations and is now the United States Ambassador to Viet-Nam, said at the time that, although his country proposed that efforts should be made to secure the control and limitation of atomic weapons, it did not think their elimination was feasible and it would not adopt any commitment that would bar their use.

This was the position of the United States representatives in regard to nuclear disarmament. Towards disarmament in general the United States position was defined in the same year -- 1956 -- by Mr. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary of State, who declared that even the very term "disarmament" should be avoided, since the United States was striving to achieve only the limitation, regulation and control of armaments. These statements were made by two responsible United States representatives ten years after the General Assembly had adopted the above-mentioned resolutions on disarmament and the elimination of atomic weapons from national armaments -- resolutions which were voted for at the time by the United States as well. They clearly show that since that time the United States position had undergone decisive and extremely negative changes. The position thus taken up by the United States precluded any agreement on either nuclear or conventional disarmament.

Ten more years have elapsed, and the negotiations on disarmament have continued fruitlessly during this whole period while at the same time the Western Powers have been actively engaged in carrying on the arms race, so that by now, in 1966, the United States armed forces have increased still further to nearly 3,000,000 men, while the military expenditure of the United States has risen to the astronomical figure of \$64,700 million.

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This is the situation as it really is; although if we look at the texts we find that United States documents submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee contain statements such as that, in the world of today, the security of a State does not necessarily increase in proportion to the increase in its armaments, since its enemies are doing the same thing; or that unlimited competition in the improvement of new destructive types of atomic weapons does not make the world any safer for either side. In these United States documents the admission is made that the security of States is greatly endangered by the atomic arms race and that the stockpiling of arms can in no way be an effective means of ensuring peace.

President Kennedy admitted in one of his speeches that our primary task in Geneva is the attainment of general and complete disarmament. In his statements on United States policy, President Kennedy came to the conclusion that the United States should review its position on the "cold war", the question of peace and disarmament, and the cessation of the arms race. Unfortunately, however, this review of policy has not yet taken place. The arms race in the United States is continuing, and military expenditure is increasing. In pursuance of its notorious policy of acting from a position of strength, the United States is waging in Viet-Nam a cruel, barbarous, destructive and imperialist war against the Viet-Nameese people.

The United States policy of intensifying the arms race has been very clearly reflected in a statement by Mr. McNamara, the United States Secretary of Defense, himself. At a press conference on 14 July last year he informed the world that during the preceding four years the United States had accomplished a 200 per cent increase in the number and power of the nuclear weapons held in a state of constant readiness by its strategic forces. The fire-power of the United States Strategic Air Command had doubled, and United States tactical nuclear forces in Western Europe had increased by 67 per cent.

On another occasion Mr. McNamara stated that the United States had assembled 5,000 nuclear warheads in this region -- Western Europe --, and that in the near future the number of nuclear weapons in Western Europe would increase by a further 20 per cent to 6,000 nuclear warheads. The number of army divisions in combat readiness -- as Mr. McNamara put it -- had increased by 45 per cent. There had



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been an eightfold increase in the strength of the "special forces" for carrying out that manifestation of imperialist policy known as "local wars". The United States Marine Corps had increased by 15,000 men. The number of tactical fighter squadrons had increased by 100 per cent. There had been a 100 per cent increase in shipbuilding to modernize the United States Navy and a 100 per cent increase in the airlift capacity for troops. The United States was putting into operation plans extending to the mid-1970's for the construction of new armaments, including various types of aircraft, surface vessels, submarines, and tanks. We could continue this enumeration to illustrate the build-up of the armaments race by the United States during these years when the Eighteen-Nation Committee has been discussing the question of general and complete disarmament.

Faced with these facts, one is bound to come regretfully to the conclusion that all the efforts of the United States and of its allies in military blocs in the course of these years have been directed, not towards disarmament and an easing of the international situation, but towards intensifying and extending the armaments race and towards increasing international tension. All this is the result of the general proclivity of American ruling circles to the pursuit of an imperialistic policy from a position of strength, to military adventures, to intervention in the internal affairs of other States, and to the suppression of national movements for freedom and independence in different parts of the world.

Such has been the course of events outside the meeting-room of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. We shall now attempt to compare, objectively and without prejudice, the basic positions of the sides in disarmament matters, to follow their tactics in the negotiations, and to compare their readiness to seek methods of solving the problem of eliminating as quickly as possible the danger of a nuclear missile war. To what extent do the policies pursued by the parties outside the Committee affect their position in discussions on general and complete disarmament? We shall try to answer this question also.

A simple comparison of the two draft treaties -- the Soviet and the United States -- permits the drawing of far-reaching conclusions indicating a fundamental difference of approach to the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament.

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The draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control which was introduced by the Soviet Union in March 1962 (ENDC/2) opens the way to delivering mankind from the threat of nuclear war and to eliminating all wars from the life of human society. The Soviet Union proposes for the first stage of disarmament -- I repeat, for the first stage -- the carrying out of measures which would eliminate the danger of nuclear war and render stockpiles of nuclear weapons harmless by destruction of the means of delivering them. Simultaneously, according to the Soviet draft treaty, foreign military bases would be liquidated, foreign troops would be withdrawn behind their own national frontiers, and conventional weapons and the armed forces of States would be substantially reduced.

In the second stage would come the banning and destruction of nuclear weapons themselves and the cessation of their production. The reduction of conventional weapons and of armed forces would continue.

The third stage would see consummated the final destruction of national military machines, the disbanding of armies and the complete destruction of all armaments. There would remain only small detachments of militia (or, in Western countries, police) to keep internal order and carry out duties connected with the maintenance of general peace and security in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Under the Soviet draft treaty the whole process of disarmament would be completed within five years.

The whole disarmament programme would be executed under strict international control fully appropriate to the scope of all the disarmament measures carried out at any given stage. Throughout the process of disarmament the security of all States -- and I stress this point -- would be equally safeguarded.

Recognition of the specific characteristics of the nuclear age in which we live is thus fundamental to the Soviet Union's approach to the main problems of general and complete disarmament. Consequently -- and no one can deny it -- the backbone of the Soviet draft agreement is the banning and complete destruction of nuclear weapons, the cessation of their production, the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets, and the prohibition of their production. In other words, it consists of measures aimed at averting the danger of nuclear war.

To take the question of eliminating the means of delivery, which has so far been a stumbling-block to negotiations in this Committee, the aim of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries in calling for the elimination of this type of armament in the first stage is to free the nations at the very beginning

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of the process of disarmament from the threat of a nuclear missile war that hangs over their heads. The carrying out of this measure in the first stage of disarmament would facilitate also the carrying out of other measures of general and complete disarmament, since, in the circumstances attending a reduction in the levels of armed forces and conventional weapons, no State would be in a position to use offensive nuclear weapons to commit acts of aggression against other States. And lastly, the essence of our proposal is in practice to exclude, from the very first stage of general and complete disarmament, any possibility of a course of events in which a State might be able, by halting the disarmament process of its own will, to achieve a strategically-advantageous position in relation to other States.

The Soviet proposals pertaining to the destruction of nuclear weapons themselves are based on the same considerations. As we have already indicated, we are prepared to go some way to meet the desire expressed by the delegations of some non-aligned States concerning the necessity of eliminating nuclear weapons early in the disarmament process, and to provide for the execution of this measure in the first stage of general and complete disarmament.

Since the Western Powers had expressed the view that it was necessary to provide States with additional guarantees for their security during the process of general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Union, as you know, took note of these observations and made a definite compromise gesture. I refer to the proposal of Mr. A.A. Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, regarding the so-called "nuclear umbrella" (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). This proposal provides for the retention, as an exceptional measure, of strictly limited agreed quantities of intercontinental anti-missile and anti-aircraft missiles with nuclear warheads on the territories of the Soviet Union and the United States until the end of the disarmament process. This "nuclear umbrella" must, of course, be so limited quantitatively as to be useless for the purposes of a nuclear war of aggression. In this respect also, therefore, we do not violate the basic principle of the need for eliminating the danger of nuclear war as soon as possible.

In this short review of the basic positions of the socialist countries I should only like to recall, too, that throughout the negotiations on general and complete disarmament the Soviet Union, as well as the other socialist countries, has striven for the establishment in the negotiations of a businesslike and constructive

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atmosphere. With this in mind, we expressed agreement with the proposal of Mr. Trivedi the representative of India, that the Committee, having approved in principle the proposal for a "nuclear umbrella", should proceed to a detailed consideration of the practical consequences of its application (ENDC/PV.177, pp.28 et seq.).

We have made other attempts to bring the positions of the sides closer together by amending and clarifying our draft treaty in accordance with the wishes expressed by other parties to the treaty. It is not the fault of the Soviet Union, of the socialist countries or of the non-aligned States that all these attempts to put the disarmament negotiations on a practical level have proved unsuccessful.

What, then, are the basic positions of the Western Powers with regard to the problems of general and complete disarmament, and what are their tactics in these negotiations? On the problem of the liquidation of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, which the Committee has been considering for the last two years, the United States "Outline" (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1, 2, 3) provides for a gradual, phased reduction of the means of delivery by approximately one-third at each stage. We have shown many times by reference to actual figures and data that in practice this method would not meet the security requirements of all States, which see the guarantee of their security in the earliest possible elimination of the threat of nuclear war. The United States approach does not answer this requirement, because the proposed reduction of the means of nuclear weapons delivery by one-third at each stage would mean that at the beginning of the second stage of disarmament the nuclear Powers would have at their disposal 70 per cent, and at the beginning of the last stage 35 per cent, of all the means of delivering nuclear weapons.

It must be clear to everyone that, considering the existing, already accumulated arsenals of the nuclear Powers, including, of course, the arsenal of the United States, which is constantly boasting to the world of its multifold superiority over all others in this respect, such a quantity of the means of delivery would, even at the third and last stage of disarmament, be more than enough with which to unleash a full-scale nuclear-missile war. This is not disarmament, it is a travesty of disarmament.

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Every serious investigator who sets himself the task of studying objectively and without prejudice all the implications of the United States Outline for Disarmament must inevitably come to this conclusion. The British Institute for Strategic Studies, whose competence in the matter no one surely has any reason to doubt, could not reach any other. The report of this Institute, "Disarmament and European Security", which gives a detailed analysis of the consequences of stage-by-stage implementation of the United States Outline contains the following extremely interesting conclusion: "A one-third reduction would not fundamentally alter the American nuclear position. A very high level of forces would remain". (vol.1,p.28)

Another disturbing feature of the United States position is that the United States Outline does not contain any clear and precise provisions either to the effect that nuclear disarmament must be completed within a specified time-limit, or to the effect that the question of nuclear disarmament must be settled at all, whatever the circumstances. But even that is not all. The participants in the negotiations will of course remember that United States representatives have told us time and again that, even if disarmament is achieved one day under their plan, the United States does not rule out the retention of some nuclear weapons for use by international security forces. It is difficult, however, to imagine how the United Nations Security Council could bring its role into greater discredit than by resorting, as the United States has in mind, to the use of nuclear weapons in fulfilling its function of maintaining peace and security -- those same weapons the use of which, under the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1961 (A/RES/1653(XVI)), was prohibited and must be considered a crime against mankind.

It need hardly be said that, from whatever angle they are approached, the proposals of the United States and the other Western Powers do not measure up to the principle of eliminating the threat of thermo-nuclear war as soon as possible. It is also characteristic of the position of the United States that during the whole of the negotiations on nuclear disarmament questions in the Eighteen-Nation Committee

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that country has invariably rejected the compromise steps proposed by the socialist countries as a means of advancing the negotiations, while at the same time it has itself not made a single step to accommodate the position of the other sides.

As an objective analysis of the position of the United States and the other Western Powers on nuclear disarmament questions shows, an understanding of the need to put an end as soon as possible to the danger of nuclear war is alien to the Governments of those Powers. And that is why the sides represented in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament are divided by differences of approach to the settlement of cardinal questions of disarmament. The socialist countries and the non-aligned States base their approach on the need for the speediest possible destruction of the instruments of nuclear war and the elimination of war altogether from the life of human society, whereas the Western countries represented in the Eighteen-Nation Committee insist on retaining the bulk of nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them almost up to the very end of the disarmament process.

As for the elimination of wars from the face of the earth, the United States clearly has no time for it. The United States Government is now mainly concerned with how further to intensify the escalation of the aggressive war in Viet-Nam and the testing there under war conditions of the latest types of weapons from United States arsenals -- such as bombers and bombs, napalm and toxic chemical gases, helicopters and guns.

Everyone realizes that the incompatible cannot be made compatible. The United States cannot, of course, continue the policy of intervention in the internal affairs of other States, of armed adventures abroad and of building up the arms race, and at the same time negotiate in the Committee about the adoption of measures to limit the arms race, about general and complete disarmament. If anyone stands with one leg on the platform and puts the other leg on the footboard of a moving railway carriage, he must either get into the carriage or get on to the platform. In such circumstances he cannot simultaneously be in the carriage and on the platform. We can only regret that the United States Government has opted, not for the relaxation of international tension and for progress in the disarmament negotiations, but for the further intensification of tension and for the obstruction of negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

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The United States representative, Mr. Fisher, referred in his statement today to the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles. By manipulating paragraph 5 of those principles he tried to make out that the Soviet proposals, which are designed to eliminate the threat of a thermo-nuclear war already at the very first stage of disarmament, run counter to that fifth principle. But let us have a look at what the fifth principle says:

"All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all." (ENDC/5, p.2).

That is the fifth principle. Just what does it say? This principle says that it is necessary to carry out measures of general and complete disarmament. But it says that they must be carried out in such a way that security is ensured equally and no military advantage is gained by anyone. If we approach an assessment of the Soviet proposals from this point of view, our proposal for the destruction at stage I of disarmament of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles ensures the security of both the United States and the Soviet Union and of all other States in the world equally. And this proposal is supported by all. Only the United States and, of course, its allies object to it. So your reference, Mr. Fisher, to paragraph 5 is irrelevant. On the contrary, paragraph 5 reinforces the position on disarmament questions set forth in the proposals of the Soviet Union.

I should also like to draw attention to the characteristic way in which Mr. Fisher, the United States representative, began to talk in his statement today about the problem of general and complete disarmament and then passed on to collateral measures, as if to evade the problem of general and complete disarmament.

But however profound the differences dividing us, however great the difficulties, peace-loving governments have no right to shirk them. International opinion and all the peoples of the world are waiting for the Western Powers, and first and foremost, of course, the United States, to show the necessary sense of responsibility and to revise their attitude to disarmament, so that the impasse in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament may be finally overcome.

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As for the Soviet Union, it can in no way reconcile itself to stagnation in the matter of disarmament. The message dated 1 February 1966 from Mr. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, contains the following sentences:

"The States members of the NATO military-political bloc which are taking part in the Committee's work have not given the Committee a chance to make any progress. However, this should not deprive the States which really want disarmament of their determination to achieve this aim and to continue their struggle both for general and complete disarmament and for the implementation of collateral measures which would clear the way to disarmament." (ENDC/167,p.1)

Failure in the disarmament negotiations can suit only the forces of imperialism and militarism, the merchants of death, those who grow fat on the arms race and find it in their interests still further to increase international tension and foster preparations for war. Success in the disarmament negotiations will be ensured if the peoples take the matter of disarmament into their own hands, and if all governments, aware of their responsibility to the peoples and to history, show firmness. We therefore also pay a tribute to the determination and persistence of the non-aligned States which here in the Committee are energetically calling for the adoption of effective measures aimed at the speediest possible elimination of the threat of thermo-nuclear war.

The Soviet Government intends as before to do everything in its power to promote agreement on disarmament. At the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 9 December 1964 Mr. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, made the following statements:

"There is no better guarantee of universal peace than the total destruction of weapons, including nuclear weapons, possessed by States... The peoples are demanding that statesmen, politicians and governments be imbued with a feeling of lofty responsibility for the fate of the world and the future of mankind. In these circumstances the Soviet Government regards the struggle for general and complete disarmament as one of the principal objectives of its foreign policy.



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"Disarmament should not be the topic of futile speeches at international conferences. We are in favour of the ideas and plans for disarmament being put into practice, and we are willing to seek various ways of solving this vital problem." (Pravda, 10 December, p.3)

Mr. Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, spoke in the same strain at the twentieth session of the General Assembly on 24 September 1965:

"We have no biased approach as to the starting point in the process of reducing and eliminating the armed forces of States, the stages into which it should be broken down and arrangements for control over disarmament -- and we repeat: over disarmament, not over armaments. What is important is that genuine disarmament should be assured, and the removal of the danger of nuclear war, and that the measures being carried out should not offer any military advantages to either of the sides." (A/PV.1335, p.17)

On the basis of this statement of principle the Soviet Union is prepared to agree to any realistic approach to the order of further work on co-ordinating a programme of general and complete disarmament. We are prepared to listen to and to take into consideration any reasonable proposals by the sides which are intended to speed up the negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

We believe that it would be appropriate and practical to organize further discussions of general and complete disarmament around the "nuclear umbrella" compromise proposal, which is supported by the majority of States represented in the Committee. But we are also prepared to accept some other order of work. If it seems desirable to some States not to press on for the time being with the discussion of stage I of disarmament, which is being blocked by the Western Powers, we do not object to embarking first on the detailed elaboration of a programme of general and complete disarmament: let us say, not from stage I, on which there are at present more differences of opinion, but -- as was suggested, for example, by the delegation of Sweden on 28 July 1964 (ENDC/PV.202, pp.7 et seq.) -- from stage III, on which a certain similarity in the positions of the sides has become apparent.

In this connexion I should like to refer also to the statement at the

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fifteenth Pugwash conference of scientists, which was held in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, from 29 December 1965 to 3 January 1966. These eminent scientists called upon the Eighteen-Nation Committee --

" ... to begin serious and detailed consideration of the general and complete disarmament treaty, possibly starting from those aspects, in the later stages in both the Soviet and American draft treaties, in which a fair measure of agreement now exists." (Statement by the Continuing Committee, p.11)

The Soviet Union has nothing against such an approach if it is capable of ensuring at least some success, some progress, in the discussion of the issues confronting us. If we succeed in reaching agreement on the basic measures of stage III such as the elimination of the "nuclear umbrella" still in the possession of the USSR and the United States and so forth, it is not impossible that this will also facilitate further negotiations on the measures for stages II and III of general and complete disarmament. We fully realize, however, that the main thing is not the method of discussing questions of disarmament nor the order in which they are discussed, but the existence in all the parties concerned of a willingness to disarm. If goodwill is shown in our negotiations not only by the socialist countries and non-aligned States, as has so far been the case, but also by the Western Powers, then the Eighteen-Nation Committee will have its first substantial successes, which are impatiently awaited by the peoples of the whole world.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland): Almost two months have elapsed since we opened this year's round of disarmament negotiations in our Committee. We have devoted a great deal of time to a general discussion and have very rightly focussed our attention on the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In doing so we have given expression to our common understanding that the most urgent task before us is to reach an agreement to halt the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world.

However, every speaker in the discussion has emphasized that a treaty on non-proliferation cannot and should not be considered as a substitute for

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disarmament. I think we all agree that such a treaty must be only a start to a much wider and more comprehensive undertaking leading eventually to our final goal: general and complete disarmament. Of course, we do not wish to imply that the attainment of such an objective will be easy. On the contrary, it must be stressed that the present international situation has rendered our task more difficult. An aggressive war is being waged by the United States against the people of Viet-Nam. Armed intervention in the internal affairs of other States has become the current practice of United States foreign policy in many parts of the world. It is indeed hard to see how such actions can be reconciled with a genuine search for the solution of the disarmament problem, and with the acceptance of all the political, social, economic, legal and moral consequences which a disarmed world would entail.

But, however difficult and complicated our task may be, it must be pursued with all the energy we can muster. This is the mandate we have received from the General Assembly of the United Nations, which has expressed the feelings of world public opinion by asking us to continue our efforts "towards making substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control..." (A/RES/2031 (XX); ENDC/161)

But this is not all. We also have a contribution to make towards the attainment of the objectives set forth in resolution 2030(XX) of the General Assembly on the question of convening a world disarmament conference (ENDC/162). Of course, our responsibility is not in the sphere of procedure; but we can play a very important role in matters of substance. Progress in our negotiations may pave the way towards wide consultations and offer the future world disarmament conference realistic chances of success.

Our discussion on general and complete disarmament is still centred on the two drafts submitted, by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1) and by the United States (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1, 2, 3). Both drafts are comprehensive and deal with measures leading towards the elimination of the military potentials of States, with verification procedures, and with legal and political matters related to international security in a disarmed world. Both drafts recognize the inseparable relationship between all those measures. But, while recognizing the

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fundamental importance of the elimination of the capacity of States to wage war, they differ both with regard to their approach to the solution of this problem and with regard to the related verification measures and the steps which should be taken in order to strengthen international security in a disarming and disarmed world. Let us briefly recall the nature of these differences.

It seems to us that the greatest difference between the United States and the Soviet drafts lies in their assessment of the function of nuclear arms. The Soviet Union represents the view shared by our delegation and many other delegations that the nuclear arms race cannot be considered as a reliable factor of individual or collective security. On the contrary, the more intensive the armaments race becomes, the greater are the dangers to world peace. With the steadily-increasing stocks of nuclear weapons and with the mounting destructive capacity of such weapons, the foundations of world peace and security are becoming more and more vulnerable. The maintenance of nuclear weapons in bases situated on foreign territories, the flights of military aircraft with nuclear weapons aboard, the increasing number of surface and underwater ships armed with nuclear weapons and cruising the seas, increase the dangers of the outbreak of a nuclear war by accident or miscalculation.

Furthermore, the continuous development of new types of nuclear weapons widens the scope of their application. They tend to be considered more and more as conventional weapons, and hence the risk that any conflict between nuclear Powers may degenerate into a nuclear holocaust. The greater the reliance of the nuclear Powers on their nuclear armouries, the less their willingness to renounce their nuclear supremacy and the greater the incentives for other countries to seek access to nuclear weapons. Finally, there is always the possibility of some technological break-through which may upset the whole precarious balance.

The fundamental problem of general and complete disarmament is therefore nuclear disarmament. The solution of this problem can be achieved only through radical measures. We must aim at eliminating the very basis of nuclear war. By adopting half-measures we shall only contribute to preserving the present structure of nuclear armaments of the nuclear States without substantially affecting their capacity to wage nuclear war.

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There are two ways of pursuing the basic objective of eliminating the threat of nuclear war: either through the total destruction of all nuclear weapons, or through the total destruction of all means of delivery. The proposals submitted to our Committee by the delegation of the Soviet Union offer a variety of alternatives, all of which are in conformity with these basic objectives. It is suggested that the nuclear disarmament process should start either by the destruction of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons followed by the destruction of nuclear weapons at the second stage of disarmament, or by the simultaneous destruction of the means of delivery and the nuclear weapons at the first stage of disarmament. At this juncture it may be worth while to remind the Committee that it was the President of the French Republic, General de Gaulle who first submitted the idea of eliminating the nuclear threat by eliminating the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. Finally, the Soviet Union has also advanced the proposal known as the Gromyko plan, (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1), under which the two large nuclear Powers would keep certain elements of their nuclear armouries, after the destruction of their nuclear weapons and of their means of delivery, until the completion of the disarmament process.

It must be emphasized that the latter proposal constitutes a major attempt on the part of the Soviet Union to meet the point of view of the Western Powers. One might have expected that this would be matched by an equal willingness on the part of the United States and its allies to find mutually-acceptable compromise solutions. Unfortunately, the Western position remains unchanged. It is still based on the 1962 concept of across-the-board percentage reductions during the three stages of disarmament. We have had the opportunity in the past to criticize the percentage approach as inconsistent with the principle of genuine disarmament. We are convinced, not only that our arguments have retained their validity, but also that with the considerable increase in quantity and quality of the nuclear arsenals of the major nuclear Powers in the course of the last few years a percentage reduction would hardly be compatible with the general desire to eliminate the dangers of nuclear war from the very outset of the disarmament process.

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The draft submitted by the Soviet Union visualizes the completion of the three stages of disarmament within a definite period. One may argue whether the time allotted for the implementation of the different measures is too long or too short; but I think it is essential to fix a time limit, a target date, for the execution of the entire plan. However, this simple but fundamental fact does not seem to be recognized by the Western Powers. In their proposals there is still no time limit set for the completion of stage III of disarmament. In other words, in their view the decisive disarmament steps which, as suggested in their draft, are to be put into effect during the last stage of the disarmament process can be delayed indefinitely. Thus the Western proposals tend to give the nuclear Powers maximum freedom of action during all stages of disarmament without impairing their basic military capabilities. Thus the option to withdraw from the agreement will always remain.

The proposals put forward by the Soviet Union deal adequately with the problem of verification and control over the implementation of the disarmament measures. They attempt to put into practice the principle of control over disarmament, while rejecting the Western approach, which seeks to establish a vast system of international control and inspection not only over compliance with the agreed disarmament steps but also over the considerable military potential which, under the Western disarmament scheme, will remain at the disposal of the major Powers for possibly an indefinite period.

In the Soviet Union proposals, control is strictly and logically related to disarmament. The area and scope of control widen in proportion to the extent of disarmament. It becomes all-embracing with the achievement of general and complete disarmament. On the other hand, the Western Powers view control as an end in itself. They want to impose a system of wide control from the very outset of their disarmament plan, although their first stages entail relatively small reductions of armaments and although in such circumstances control could be misused for purposes contrary to the interests of international peace and security.

We all realize that international relations in a disarmed world will bear little resemblance to the situation today. It is therefore only proper that the disarmament plans should try to deal with the international political consequences

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of disarmament and formulate the principles which should govern the relations between nations in a world in which the use of force for settling disputes will be replaced by the rule of law. There can be no doubt that disarmament will profoundly influence the international climate. Confidence will replace the prevailing mistrust. The scope of international co-operation in all fields -- political, social, economic, cultural and scientific -- will widen considerably. The resources freed by disarmament and put into productive use, both internally and as part of a world-wide co-operative venture to assist the developing countries, will contribute to a general increase in the standards of living of all peoples. Economic development, scientific conquest will become the common venture of mankind.

What will be needed will be an international organization able to channel the energies of all nations into one stream of peaceful and productive pursuits. The general framework of such an organization exists already. It is the United Nations. We do not want to imply that we believe that system to be perfect; but it is our view that the legal framework of a disarmed world must utilize all the positive elements of the existing international legal order, which are far from being negligible. We see no need for an entirely new peace-keeping machinery; and in particular we are opposed to the concept of an international army possessing nuclear weapons.

Those were the very brief and general observations that my delegation wished to offer at this stage of our discussion. We should like to express the hope that the Western Powers will reconsider their present position and submit new proposals which may open the way to fruitful negotiations. Progress will be made only if the Western Powers accept our basic premise: that the key to general and complete disarmament is nuclear disarmament achieved by radical steps at the very early stages of the disarmament process; for this is the only possibility of making general and complete disarmament a practical proposition.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 248th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. G.O. Ijewere, representative of Nigeria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union and Poland.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 17 March 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.